The Middle East in 2025: Options for the New Administration

In the first three months of the Trump-Vance Administration, U.S. engagement in the Middle East has already made formidable strides on the path towards enduring stability and peace in the region. Foremost among these are President Trump’s leadership on Gaza’s future, restoring maximum pressure on the Iranian regime while opening the door to direct negotiations with them regarding their nuclear program, and achieving a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah on the Lebanese border.

The following series takes these efforts as a baseline for presenting the Trump Administration with a longer view regarding the dynamics and factors at play in the region’s top flashpoints, as well as potential options for how to proceed. The series avoids offering policy recommendations and instead presents the President and his team with practical options based on how circumstances appear at the time of publication.

IRAN BETWEEN BOMB AND BREAKING POINT

Where We Are: In the eighteen months following the most devastating attack by one of its proxies against Israel, the Iranian regime is the weakest it has ever been since it came to power half a century ago. Most of its regional proxies have either completely or near-completely disappeared due to Israel’s bold and stunning regional campaign, and the Houthis—who have attacked Israel from Yemen and have threatened international trade in the Red Sea—are currently the focus of U.S. air strikes. Israel’s similarly impressive intelligence and military actions – including inside of Iran itself – have doubtless sent shocks throughout Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and leadership circles. Iran’s unprecedented two direct state-on-state attacks against Israel over the same period—the latter being the largest single launch of ballistic missiles in history—resulted in minimal damage and virtually no casualties, largely owing to Israel’s air defense systems and regional partner coordination. Israel’s responses to Iran on both occasions sent a single message—that it can strike anywhere inside of Iran at any time—a message that to this day has put an end to any further direct saber rattling by the regime.

These developments—doubtless unexpected by the regime and brought about because of the actions of its proxies—coincide with two other milestones that face the regime in the near term: nuclear breakout and leadership transition. The United States, moreover, will lose a key tool for addressing the former, with the expiration of the United Nations snapback sanctions in October 2025.

The Biden Administration had not pursued a “plan B” after their attempts to revive the Obama Administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), otherwise known as the “Iran nuclear deal.” When Hamas launched its attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the administration’s entire attention focused almost entirely on trying to diplomatically quell Iran’s regional escalation—all while not holding Iran accountable—at the expense of any planning on how to confront or prevent an Iranian nuclear breakout.

Current Policy: President Trump has repeatedly stated that he will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon under his watch and that he prefers to ensure this through diplomacy, but should negotiations fail, he will revert to military options. During Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to the White House on April 7, 2025, President Trump announced that his team will be meeting with Iranian regime counterparts in Oman to begin negotiations. President Trump has identified a two-month window to give negotiations a chance, and his team – led by Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff – has engaged in three rounds of talks.

Diplomacy will ultimately not succeed in achieving the goal of dismantling Iran’s nuclear program given the Iranian regime’s past record of negotiations with the United States and its view of negotiations as a stall tactic to buy itself time to covertly continue developing a nuclear program. It therefore may be a matter of time before the U.S. will begin considering military options. Indeed, over the last several weeks, the administration has moved many assets into the Middle East—including THAAD air defense systems, Patriot missile batteries, and bombers—and has conducted joint exercises with the Israeli air force.

Analysis: The Trump Administration returns to the White House with a strong legacy of Iranian foreign policy from its first term: “maximum pressure.” The regime responds only to signs of strength, as its current state in response to Israel’s actions over the last sixteen months demonstrates. “Maximum pressure,” as principally an economic and diplomatic policy, should be foundational, but needs to be recalibrated to be effective in Iran’s circumstances in 2025. These include not only the regional and global environment and Iran’s activities in the Middle East and beyond—whether seeking to retain its foothold in Syria or its support to Russia’s and China’s violations of Iranian oil sanctions—but also the limitations of the existing tools (such as sanctions) to effect change on their own. At the same time, as the last two years have demonstrated, there is new willingness by partners in the region (and beyond) to address Iran’s threats. Considering these circumstances, the key questions facing the Trump Administration in its second term vis-à-vis Iran are: what does maximum pressure look like today, and how will the United States address the threat of a potential nuclear breakout by Iran over the coming months when diplomacy does not deliver that objective? There is also the question of what role the United States ultimately decides to play if and when Israel – which may decide to use military force inside of Iran, as it has done over the last eighteen months – decides to take military action over the coming months.

Options for What to Do:

• Maintain Maximum Pressure 1.0: Reverting to maximum pressure 1.0 would appear to make the most sense, both because it is the administration’s approach during the first term and because it was effective. As an economic and diplomatic policy, it would also scratch the itch of those who seek either to restrain the use of military power or to limit its use to certain theaters. It is for these same reasons that reverting to this approach would not be adequate to deal with an Iran who has a new appetite for escalatory behavior, has deep involvements in other theaters. Beyond the limited effectiveness of restraining Iran’s aggressiveness today, a narrow adherence to policies from the first term with no modification could be exploited by Russia and China as an opportunity to advance their agendas. A U.S. posture towards Iran that explicitly rules out military action risks weakening the regional deterrent that Israel so assiduously built over the last sixteen months, leaving it effectively to impose consequences on Iran itself—a prospect that, as Israel has demonstrated but for which it must have (at a minimum) reliable and regular military resupply by the United States.

• Counter-Iran Coalition: What is needed at this pivotal moment of transition is an approach that capitalizes on what has worked in the past and what new ideas can be introduced to address the range of Iran’s present activities. Designing the right policy paradigm depends on our global partners and their willingness to share responsibility in both confronting Iran’s threats and filling the vacuums across the Middle East where its power has been diminished or eliminated. Multinational bodies, moreover, are not only irrelevant, but have proven over the last two years their willingness to carry water for the Iranian regime. There is an existing structure with a decade of momentum—the D-ISIS Coalition—which can be reenergized and repurposed. To achieve this triad of priorities, the United States can transform and further expand this structure into a Counter-Iran Coalition. The responsibilities would necessarily include the current missions vis-à-vis ISIS, whose rise and fall in some measure depend upon opportunities created by those of Iran and its proxies. It would also include commitments from our regional partners for governance efforts in post-proxy areas (i.e., Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Gaza, West Bank). Our European partners who have been part of the D-ISIS Coalition and who have been active in disrupting Iranian regional escalation over the last year would help augment these efforts with security reinforcement, as well as with developing military options with the U.S. and regional partners in order to reinforce the impact of sanctions on restraining the Iranian regime’s actions and preempting any steps towards nuclear breakout or other escalatory efforts.

GAZA: FROM HOSTAGE RESCUE TO RIVIERA

Where We Are: Hamas continues to hold 59 hostages (out of the original 251 taken on October), including one living American citizen. Hamas’s obstinance in negotiations has also tested President Trump’s ultimatum of “hell to pay,” leaving Israel with no other option but to renew its military efforts against the terrorist organization.

Separately, on March 4, 2025, Egypt (with the support of the Arab League and a number of European partners) presented their plan for the reconstruction of Gaza following President Trump’s announcement a month prior of turning the region into a “riviera.” Notwithstanding its detailed multiphase plan to reconstruct Gaza’s physical infrastructure, Egypt’s plan fell short of both U.S. and Israeli expectations, as it neither mentions Hamas nor offers a solution for how to prevent the organization from reconstituting. Egypt’s plan also avoids temporarily moving Gazans from the area—a step that President Trump explicitly called for, and a necessary one given that Hamas has transformed every element of civilian life, from hospitals to children’s bedrooms, into parts of its military infrastructure. A temporary relocation of Gaza’s residents is therefore a necessary step in dismantling Hamas’s footprint in the territory.

In recent weeks, many Gazans have taken to the streets to demonstrate against Hamas, reflecting the terrorist group’s steady decline in popularity in the area. The timing of this development suggests many Gazans have found the confidence to publicly express their sentiments about Hamas, given the new, complete alignment between the United States and Israel—an alignment that was absent during the Biden Administration.

Current Policy: Throughout his presidential campaign and subsequently during his four months in office, President Trump has reiterated the ultimatum that Hamas would have “hell to pay” if they did not release all the hostages. Concurrently, in a reversal of Biden Administration policy, President Trump and his team have sent Israel munitions that were held up by their predecessors and have refrained from commenting on how Israel chooses to prosecute its mission in Gaza. (By contrast, the Biden team used to consistently dictate Israel’s military operations.) Furthermore, President Trump and his team have completely reversed the Biden Administration’s rhetoric about Israel, applauding and standing firmly by Israel and the decisions they make for the sake of Israeli security—a clear contrast to the Biden Administration’s public rebukes of Israel.

Analysis: The Trump Administration’s change in policy and rhetoric has created conditions for peace and stability and has fostered new and much needed momentum for Israel as their seven-front war enters into the eighteenth month. This is not only due to the administration’s open and unconditioned support for Israel (including two visits to the White House by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu) and its provision of military assistance, but also because of its reversal of previous U.S. policy towards the Iranian regime, as the Trump Administration rolled out its maximum pressure campaign. Additionally, on several occasions, President Trump has signaled the importance of a plan for Gaza’s future—a topic long deferred, if ignored, by regional partners.

Options for What to Do: Currently, it appears that no alternative to Egypt’s Gaza plan has been presented or discussed, even though Egypt’s plan has been endorsed by European and Arab partners. The more pressing near-term priority is the release of the remaining 59 hostages in Hamas captivity. The Trump Administration can potentially leverage its actions towards Iran and its other proxies—from the nuclear negotiations to the air strikes on the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen (whom Trump explicitly described as acting on Iran’s behalf) —to facilitate the release of the remaining hostages.

• Limit Engagement on the Subject to Support for Israel’s Expanded Campaign in Gaza: To maintain the most options for advancing other regional priorities, the Trump Administration could choose to silo out Gaza from other issues. For example, many regional partners have avoided raising the Abraham Accords (the chief Middle East accomplishment of President Trump’s first term) after Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack. A case could be made, therefore, that the Trump Administration could keep the issues separate and perhaps build leverage over Hamas by expanding the Abraham Accords, beginning with Israel-Saudi normalization—the very milestone that Hamas’s attack was aimed at preventing. However, it is unclear what incentives will resonate with Arab partners to compel them to reengage on the Abraham Accords while Israel continues its efforts in Gaza.

• Regional “Rivieras” Approach: Given his personal interest in seeing Gaza rebuilt, President Trump has an opportunity to demand deeper and more direct engagement from our regional partner. This engagement should be focused not only on Gaza, but also on other parts of the region where Iran once had strongholds or where it is looking to escalate. Specifically, Arab partners can shape the conditions for stability and peace in the region by following on Israel’s successful military efforts to further push Iran and its proxies out. This could begin with Lebanon, where Hezbollah can be further militarily and politically marginalized; southern and eastern Syria, which had been Iranian regime strongholds; and Yemen. The West Bank should receive attention as well, where Iran has been smuggling weapons for nearly three years to stage an attack like Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack.

• Transition Iran Negotiations to Focus on Its Regional Activities, Beginning with Hostage Release: Over the coming weeks, it will become increasingly evident whether Iran will negotiate in good faith, although all signs currently (and historical precedent) indicate that they will merely use negotiations as a ploy to buy time while they continue to enrich uranium below the radar. As the Trump Administration moves to military options for ensuring that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon, the administration can concurrently reframe their current Iran negotiations as a vehicle for reaching a deal on Iran’s regional activities, which could begin by demanding that the regime ensures Hamas releases all the hostages. Such a diplomatic approach—coupled with a carte blanche from this administration allowing Israel to take any military actions at any time of their choosing to eliminate Iran’s nuclear and conventional weapons development—could create an unprecedented form of leverage over Iran in negotiations while keeping their proxies down—if not well on their way out—across the region.

SYRIA AFTER ASSAD

Where We Are: Virtually overnight, Syria’s 14-year civil war entered a new phase with the ouster of Bashar al-Assad and the end of the family’s half-century hold on power. The dominant and de-facto group to claim power is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (better known by its acronym, HTS) with its leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani shedding his jihadist persona (including reverting to his given name, Ahmad Sharaa, and donning a suit). HTS, an offshoot of al-Qaeda and designated a foreign terrorist organization in 2018, seeks international recognition and has been taking meetings with foreign delegations, including a U.S. delegation that reportedly met in Damascus in December of 2024.

Current Policy: Nowhere has U.S. foreign policy been as confused or conflicted about strategy as it has been in Syria during the last 14 years. In the years that the U.S. did have a policy, it vacillated mostly between hubris and half-measures. President Obama’s slogan of “Assad must go,” was followed by half-measures to support some opposition groups without a policy end state. When Assad crossed a red line that President Obama had drawn and the Obama Administration failed to act on its ultimatum, U.S. credibility eroded in Syria while elevating Iran’s hand. One outcome of these consequences two years later was the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), who declared its “caliphate” across large swaths of eastern Syria. This became the new focus of the Obama Administration and thereafter. During the first term of the Trump Administration, the ISIS caliphate was eliminated and that objective (or at least the territorial aspect of it) was achieved, thereby providing a reasonable opportunity for the United States to pivot its attention away from Syria. In addition to eliminating the ISIS caliphate, the Trump Administration in its first term set the priority of pushing Iran and its proxies out of Syria. Later, under the Biden Administration, ISIS was able to reconstitute in the country and the Iranian military was able to build up its presence there. However, the latter has been dramatically reversed by Israel’s airstrikes in Syria during the last eighteen months.

Analysis: The challenge to U.S. policy in Syria has been created by the United States itself, specifically under the Obama Administration. By the end of the Obama Administration – having effectively led to the creation of a more complicated set of issues in the country due to its lack of policy focus and enforcement – the United States was juggling both the challenge of ISIS and the myriad of new challenges that emerged in the context of Assad’s effort to hold onto power, such as:

• The weakening or disappearance of local governance.
• Deconfliction with Russia.
• De-escalation of Turkish-Kurdish tensions in the north.
• The cohesion of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is the U.S.’s main local force.
• Preventing Syria from becoming a terrorist hotbed.

Lost amid these issues, however important, was the growing influence of the Iranian military inside Syria. The U.S. forces stationed there have been focused narrowly on the ISIS mission. The Iranian military challenge—specifically the buildup of military infrastructure and the transfer of weapons and fighters into the country in support of the regime and in coordination with Hezbollah—was the focus of Israel’s covert efforts over the course of a decade, its “campaign between the wars” (CBW). In the post-October 7 environment, CBW broadened in geographic and targeting scope across Syria and Lebanon and focused not only on eliminating weapons but also the elimination of Iranian generals. In early 2024, Iran cited the success of Israel’s efforts with the need to draw down its military presence in the country for fear of losing more of its top brass—a decision that, in its withdrawal of direct military support for the Assad regime and coupled with the concurrent eradication of Hezbollah’s leadership and infrastructure, proved to be determinative in Assad’s fall, thus leading to the present situation. There is, moreover, at least one U.S. citizen, Austin Tice, still in Syrian regime custody and believed to be alive.

Options for What to Do: Engagement with the new interim government in Syria appears to become an increasingly popular position for both the international community and within U.S. policy circles, particularly given the immediate needs to address the humanitarian crisis in the country. As part of this position, there is now a new conversation emerging about whether sanctions should be lifted (and which). (HTS has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by both the United States and the United Nations Security Council.) In the immediate aftermath of Assad’s ouster, President Trump announced that this is not our war and has not engaged with the Sharaa government.

• Engage with al-Sharaa and Interim Government: The Biden Administration and many European and Middle Eastern partners have reached out to Ahmad al-Sharaa, all recognizing that failing to do so risks al-Sharaa choosing to align with our adversaries. There is also at least one U.S. citizen, Austin Tice, who is believed to still be alive, and engagement with al-Sharaa could be a channel to find and rescue him. The challenge is that al-Sharaa is still an unknown actor, given his sudden change of persona. This lack of clarity about him is part of his lack of credibility, as it is currently unclear whether he is in a position to deliver on U.S. priorities, including Tice’s release. Engagement with him without clarity about his intentions or his abilities also risks bolstering his legitimacy by suggesting the United States acknowledges his position as the governing power in Syria.

• Maintain D-ISIS Mission: ISIS has been steadily seeking to regain ground over the past year amid new strains on Assad and Iranian proxies. There is certainly logic to retaining the current focus on the D-ISIS mission set, particularly with the possibility of numerous ISIS fighters being released from detention. Their primary adversary is the group currently angling for governing authority (HTS), and in recent weeks, al-Sharaa has found opportunities in the arrests of ISIS fighters to achieve twin objectives of burnishing his non-jihadi credentials while keeping a rival down. In other words, an ISIS resurgence will face real obstacles from local groups and other powers in a way that it hadn’t a decade ago. There are also open questions about the future of this approach, especially absent a policy objective (e.g., dismantling the territorial caliphate) as the U.S.’s local partner forces are greatly strained and fractured, the lack of clarity about what governance and stabilization looks like in liberated areas, and the opportunity cost of ignoring Iran’s military buildup across the country.

• D-ISIS + Israel’s CBW: This new mission for the nearly 2,000 U.S. troops currently stationed in Syria would enable the U.S. to focus on the twin direct threats to Americans’ security that could emanate from current circumstances: 1) a resurgence of ISIS and 2) a rebuilding of Iran’s military infrastructure and presence. Notably, altering the current D-ISIS mission to include augmentation of Israel’s “campaign between the wars” (CBW) vis-à-vis Iran and its proxies need not require an addition of personnel and would protect the U.S. focus in the country from mission creep—namely, entanglement in Syria’s still-murky political transition.

LEBANON AFTER CEASEFIRE

Where We Are: Following “Operation Grim Beeper”—the masterful Israeli covert action operation in which Israel inserted itself into Hezbollah’s communication device supply chain, leading to the incapacitation of thousands of fighters from a beeper attack and a subsequent walkie-talkie attack—and the targeted assassinations of Hezbollah leadership, the group went from the primary Iranian proxy to an organization struggling to stave off failure. Former leader Hassan Nasrallah has been replaced by Sheikh Naim Qassem—a leader who lacks the charismatic and strategic capabilities possessed by his predecessor. Operational capabilities have been nearly nullified, with the IDF estimating 80% less in military capabilities and an over 50% reduction in available personnel. Hezbollah still maintains its presence within the Lebanese Parliament, but after the 2022 elections, it no longer controls the president or prime minister. Those same elections also saw the Hezbollah coalition's seat proportion drop from 71/128 to 61/128, resulting in the loss of the majority. The November 24, 2024, ceasefire saw an extension that prolonged its expiration to February 18, 2025, but since then has seen no movement. In recent weeks, the Trump Administration successfully brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has mostly held since then. In addition to the full dismantlement of Hezbollah military infrastructure on the border, a long-term solution will depend in part on the future of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as well as the activities of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Current Policy: The desired future of Lebanon is simple: a state without Hezbollah or any other Iranian proxy intervening with its governmental affairs. The designation of Hezbollah as an FTO in 1997 was the first step in that direction. The designation has heightened the U.S.’s ability to deter funding intended for the group and has enabled increased coordination with global partners regarding the group’s activities. For all the advances these efforts have made in curbing Hezbollah’s global activities, they have been limited in politically marginalizing Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah, meanwhile, has only grown as a threat to Israel. On October 8, 2023—just one day after Hamas’s barbaric attack—Hezbollah launched its cross-border attacks into Israeli towns in the north, positioned its elite Radwan Force (trained in cross-border infiltration) on the border, and launched increasingly sophisticated projectiles into the country, leaving roughly 80,000 Israelis internally displaced to this day. All of this activity is in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701. Efforts to disrupt Hezbollah’s political reach have seen an uptick following IDF operations—a trend that has also seen a heightened sense of urgency emulated by the U.S. Despite the Trump Administration freezing international foreign aid to all countries (other than Israel and Egypt), the urgency surrounding Lebanon’s fragile domestic economic situation led to the approval of a waiver that would unfreeze $95 million in aid. Subsequent funding has been issued with the contingency that the LAF continue to show considerable progress in confiscating Hezbollah weapons and shutting down cells.

Analysis: The biggest hurdle for U.S. policy regarding Lebanon is countering Hezbollah interference while attempting to stabilize the nation. Prior to Nasrallah’s assassination, U.S. involvement in Lebanon focused heavily on attempting to eradicate the group vis-à-vis military strength. Neglected by this decision, however, was the political power that the group held. With a heavy focus on taking out primary leadership, Iran capitalized and covertly operated the Lebanese government with little interference. Thus, the challenge now becomes balancing rebuilding Lebanon—whose economy has been ravaged by war and where many Gulf partners have withdrawn their economic assistance in light of Iran’s growing influence there—while also working to help the country transition into a stable political structure. The elections of President Aboud and Prime Minister Salam (neither of whom were Hezbollah-backed) were a good start, but forward progress must persist should this trend continue through the 2026 elections.

Options for What to Do: Despite the country’s new presidency and Hezbollah’s current weakened state, the window for keeping Lebanon on a positive trajectory may be closing as Iran scrambles to prevent the loss of its strongest regional ally. The most pressing issues remain: the confiscation of arms from Hezbollah and the terrorist group’s complete political and societal marginalization. The Lebanese Armed Forces are seen as too weak against Hezbollah and UNIFIL and have proved ineffective at keeping Hezbollah from violating the UN resolutions regarding the Israel-Lebanon border. The United States is correct to continue to focus on keeping the ceasefire in place and has further options for how to engage. U.S leadership is necessary for ensuring the enforcement of the UN resolutions pertaining to the Israel-Lebanon border, as evinced by the record of failure of both UNIFIL and the LAF. The failures of both the LAF and UNIFIL to enforce the UN resolutions pertaining to the Israel-Lebanon border.

• Continue Placing Pressure on Hezbollah’s Political Wing: With the Hezbollah coalition losing its majority in the Parliament, the group will be working to both rebuild trust with the Lebanese population as it seeks to counter Western messaging. Hezbollah politicians, while in power, will continue to serve as a mouthpiece for the Iranian regime, and while questions remain regarding coalition stability, a political resurgence for Hezbollah poses just as big of a threat as a military resurgence. Sanctions stemming from the multiple FTO designations have helped limit the group’s ability to conduct business, while other pressures (such as economic sanctions on associated entities) have been credited with dampening the group's presumed influence.

• Counter-Hezbollah Coalition: Looking beyond Beirut, there are other countries in the Levant that desire the same suppression of Iranian influence as the West does. To the south, IDF outposts have assisted in the monitoring and deterrence of Hezbollah militants. Simultaneously, countries such as KSA and Jordan have negotiated deals with the new Lebanese government, increasing both economic and humanitarian aid into the country. Jordan has taken an assertive stance in interdicting Hezbollah’s captagon trade, which affects Jordanian and other regional societies. With the region's biggest players already coming to the aid of Lebanon, the creation of a counter-Hezbollah coalition is not out of the realm of possibility.

• Maintain Contingency Funding for the LAF: Despite the clear structural problems with the LAF, there is logic in providing conditional funding to them, particularly as a potential carrot should it show positive progress in enforcing the UN charters. A stable Lebanon is ultimately contingent upon the success of a strong national military free of Iranian influence and the ability to work with the United States and its partners to advance shared regional priorities. Consistent pressure on the LAF also limits potential segments of the group from becoming compromised. Continued U.S. involvement in this deal alludes to the possibility of an outcome different from when the resolutions were first adopted in 2006.

The Future of UNIFIL: With President Aoun publicly stating that he is against private contractors enforcing the UNSCRs, strategic changes to UNIFIL are not out of the realm of possibility. Any change to the mission of UNIFIL would not only require the approval of the U.S. and Lebanon but would also loop in the European nations invested in its mission. With the Ukraine war coming to a close, the timing may be right to consider how and which European partners can augment their contributions to UNIFIL to meet today’s regional realities. Consequential changes would not require a significant structural overhaul, nor would they alter UNIFIL’s founding mission. Considerations for the group would inspect elements such as the group’s efficiency, areas of influence, and operational capacities

ABRAHAM ACCORDS 2.0 AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Where We Are: As the signature foreign policy achievement of the first term of the Trump Administration, the Abraham Accords was actively suppressed during the first year of the Biden Administration. It was only in the summer of 2023 that the Biden team – looking to define its legacy in the Middle East, especially having failed at reviving President Obama Iran nuclear deal – began to push for the expansion of the Abraham Accords through the normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack, which was timed in part to stop this event, effectively put a halt to any public discussion of the Abraham Accords while prompting Saudi Arabia to demand two new conditions for normalization of ties with Israel: 1) a path towards Palestinian statehood and 2) a defense arrangement from the United States.

Current Policy: Today, there is bipartisan support for the Abraham Accords across both the Biden and Trump administrations, as well as bipartisan and bicameral support in Congress that desires expansion of the Accords. Moreover, it is perhaps due to the momentum of the Accords, as well as the shared perception of the threats that Iran poses to the region, that many regional partners came to Israel’s defense, both reportedly blocking efforts to impose regional embargoes on Israel, as well as military in stopping Iran’s two direct attacks against Israel. The latter was in no small part a consequence of Israel being a part of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Analysis: The clear benefits of the Accords and the recent defense military collaborations with Israel in the face of Iranian escalation all point to continued (if still quiet) appetite from regional partners to resume the collaborations and expansion of the Accords that took place prior to October 7. The Trump Administration brings not only a change of tone, but also a clarity of policy towards regional partners and against the Iranian regime, all of which will likely catalyze the Accords to resume, making it a question of not if but how far those will advance. For the Accords to meet their full potential of providing regional peace and stability, there must be some kind of arrangements made for responsibility for post-proxy areas. With a diminished or disappeared Iranian footprint, those areas should present only opportunities for regional partners to fill the vacuum and help shape local conditions. This will not come automatically; it will require a committed a U.S. focus and (potentially) commitments to regional partners who may be looking to the United States for assurances as Iran seeks to escalate against them. Regional partners may understandably see the moment as a time to inject their requests, and the United States must assess these on a case-by-case basis in terms of their impact upon U.S. interests. In short, it will be a process, but with new leadership in the White House, there are new opportunities for setting the region on an even brighter path, particularly one where the Iranian regime is diminished.

Options for What to Do:

• Continue Former Course: The commercial benefits of the Abraham Accords for both Israel and its neighbors make eminent sense and will be welcomed by all parties, beginning with the normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the Accords are the least contentious route for normalization of ties, with a focus on expansion of commercial, diplomatic, and other socio-economic elements, steering clear of political or regional third rails. That being said, as statements from Saudi Arabia over the last year indicate, regional partners may have new demands of Israel and the United States in the post-October 7 environment, particularly surrounding Palestinians and defense arrangements. While it remains to be clear how wedded Saudi Arabia will be to the Trump Administration, a simple, commercially focused proposal for normalization may not address these new concerns.

Integrate into Regional Post-Proxy Planning: The United States can preempt (and, in part, placate) the new demands of regional partners and also advance its regional objectives by not only pushing for the normalization of ties between Israel and its neighbors, but using the normalization of ties as a vehicle to secure partners’ commitments to stabilize areas of the region from which Iran and its proxies have been pushed (i.e., Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen). The West Bank—where Iran has tried assiduously for the last several years to build into a staging ground for another October 7-style attack and where Hamas is vying for power—should be among these locations. Integrating this regional post-proxy planning would be in the interest of all regional partners by definitively diminishing Iran’s footprint in their backyards, by creating new opportunities for future Abraham Accords candidates, and by building on the effective regional cooperation to stop Iran’s attacks over the last sixteen months.

BIOS

Jacob Olidort, Ph.D., is Director of the Center for American Security at the America First Policy Institute.

Ethan Tan is Policy Analyst at the Center for American Security at the America First Policy Institute.